Capacity Allocation and Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances: A Combinatorial Auction-Based Modeling
点击次数：
所属单位：民航学院
发表刊物：MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS IN ENGINEERING
关键字：VERTICAL COMPETITION MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS
摘要：This paper attempts to establish a framework to help airline alliances effectively allocate their seat capacity with the purpose of maximizing alliances' revenue. By assuming the airline alliance as the auctioneer and seat capacity in an itinerary as lots, the combinatorial auction model is constructed to optimize the allocation of the seat, and the revenue sharing method is established to share revenue between partners by Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. The result of the numerical study shows that the seat capacity allocation is effective even without information exchanging completely and the twofold revenue shares method shows more excitation for the airlines.
ISSN号：1024-123X
是否译文：否
发表时间：2017-01-01
合写作者：Gu, Ying-jing
通讯作者：Gu, Ying-jing,朱金福