Recovering memory access sequence with differential flush+reload attack
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所属单位：计算机科学与技术学院/人工智能学院/软件学院
发表刊物：Lect. Notes Comput. Sci.
摘要：Side-channel attacks are effective attacks against modern cryptographic schemes, which exploit the leaking information besides input and output to the algorithm. As one of the cache-based side-channel attacks, Flush+Reload features high resolution, low noise, and virtual machine compatibility. However, a state-of-the-art Flush+Reload attack only reveals whether the memory address is accessed or not. This paper presents differential Flush+Reload attack that can recover the access sequence of memory addresses, which could lead to new vulnerabilities. The idea is to analyze statistical difference among multiple Flush+Reload results. Specifically, we add controlled delay between the start of victim calculation and the memory flush. Multiple Flush+Reload results with different delays are measured to determine the memory access sequence. Under this concept, we demonstrate the details of a successful recovery of T-table access sequences for an AES implementation from MatrixSSL version 3.9.3 on an Intel CPU. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018.
ISSN号：0302-9743
是否译文：否
发表时间：2018-01-01
合写作者：Yuan, Zhiwei,Li, Yang,Sakiyama, Kazuo,Sugawara, Takeshi
通讯作者：王箭