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个人信息Personal Information
教授 博士生导师
招生学科专业:
机械工程 -- 【招收博士、硕士研究生】 -- 机电学院
机械 -- 【招收博士、硕士研究生】 -- 机电学院
毕业院校:南京航空航天大学
学历:南京航空航天大学
学位:工学博士学位
所在单位:机电学院
办公地点:A4-4323
联系方式:13770600084
电子邮箱:
Product design and production decision of closed-loop supply chain under government fund
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所属单位:经济与管理学院
发表刊物:Jisuanji Jicheng Zhizao Xitong
摘要:To discuss the effect of discarded electronics fund policy on operation decision and operation efficiency of closed-loop supply chain, based on the influence of government environmental tax, recycling subsidy and award-penalty for product design on the cost of new products and remanufactured products, the Stackelberg game theory was used to investigate the influences of fund policy on optimal product design decision, production decision and profit in the closed-loop supply chain. With the help of numerical analysis, the best regulatory level of environmental tax, recycling subsidy and award-penalty for product design were explored. The results showed that the manufacturer's choice of disassemblability design strategy was related to the cost parameter of product design and the level of award-penalty, but had no direct relations to the environmental tax and recycling subsidy. The environmental tax and recycling subsidy were always detrimental to the manufacturer but conducive to the remanufacturer, and the damage to the manufacturer's economy could be made up by the implementation of award-penalty policy for product design. The government should make the appropriate environmental tax, recycling subsidy and award-penalty for product design to promote synchronous development of new product and remanufactured product, and maximize the total social welfare. © 2018, Editorial Department of CIMS. All right reserved.
ISSN号:1006-5911
是否译文:否
发表时间:2018-02-01
合写作者:李帮义,Tang, Juan,Gong, Bengang
通讯作者:刘志东