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所属单位：计算机科学与技术学院/人工智能学院/软件学院

发表刊物：Tsinghua Sci. Tech.

摘要：: As an emerging “human problem solving strategy”, crowdsourcing has attracted much attention where requesters want to employ reliable workers to complete specific tasks. Task assignment is an important branch of crowdsourcing. Most existing studies in crowdsourcing have not considered self-interested individuals' strategy. To guarantee truthfulness, auction has been regarded as a promising method to charge the requesters for the tasks completed and reward the workers for performing the tasks. In this study, an online task assignment scenario is considered where each worker has a set of experienced skills, whereas a specific task is budget-constrained and requires one or more skills. In this scenario, the crowdsourcing task assignment was modeled as a reverse auction where the requesters are buyers and the workers are sellers. Three incentive mechanisms, namely, Truthful Mechanism for Crawdsourcing-Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (TMC-VCG), TMC-Simple Task (ST) for a simple task case, and TMC-Complex Task (CT) for a complex task case are proposed. Here, a simple task case means that the requester asks for a single skill, and a complex task case means that the requester asks for multiple skills. The related properties of each of the three mechanisms are determined theoretically. Moreover, the truthfulness is verified, and other performances are evaluated by extensive simulations. © 2018 Tsinghua University Press. All rights reserved.

ISSN号：1007-0214

是否译文：否

发表时间：2018-12-01

合写作者：Zhang, Yonglong,Qin, Haiyan,Li, Bin,Wang, Jin,Lee, Sungyoung

通讯作者：黄志球